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Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of direct presidential elections on legislative 
party systems. We argue that presidential power shapes the effective number 
of presidential candidates in a way that will have a reductive effect on the 
legislative party system, but this reduction will be observed only within an 
intermediary range of presidential power. We also argue that this proposition 
should be tested solely on the population of countries with direct presidential 
elections. We find that the effect of presidential coattails is less important than 
has typically been suggested, that by contrast presidential power has an 
influence on the legislative party system, but also that we need to think 
carefully about how to capture variation in presidential power when trying to 
estimate its effect. This latter point applies to the debate about the 
determinants of the legislative party system but also to debates about the 
effect of presidential power more generally. 
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 Introduction 
 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of legislative party systems. At 
the most general level, there is basic agreement that institutional and social 
factors interact to generate party system structures. To this end, scholars 
typically focus on the effects of specific electoral systems and the impact of 
social heterogeneity (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Mozaffar et al 2003). However, 
scholars have increasingly integrated other factors into the study of legislative 
party systems. Specifically, there is an ongoing debate about the effect of 
direct presidential elections. Here, there is support for the proposition that 
presidential coattails help to shape the legislative party system (Amorim Neto 
and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006; Samuels and Shugart 2010; 
Shugart 1995; Hicken and Stoll 2013; Stoll 2013). The idea that the relative 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections is a determinant of the 
electoral competition is highly intuitive. However, recent work has stressed 
how the effect of presidential coattails is contingent upon other factors. 
Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Golder (2006) have emphasized the 
interaction between the proximity of elections and the effective number of 
presidential candidates at the previous presidential election. In turn, Hicken 
and Stoll (2013) have stressed the importance of presidential power as a 
further interaction term. 
In this article, we build on existing work. First, we argue that 
propositions about presidential coattails should be tested solely on the 
population of countries with direct presidential elections, whereas to date 
such propositions have included parliamentary republics and monarchies in 
the sample. Second, we follow Hicken and Stoll in hypothesizing that 
presidential power is likely to shape the effective number of presidential 
candidates in a way that will have a reductive effect on the legislative party 
system, but we argue that this reduction will be clearly observed only within 
an intermediary range of presidential power. This is because political parties 
have a distinct incentive to coordinate their electoral behavior at presidential 
elections only within such a range. By contrast, with both weak and strong 
presidents there are conflicting coordination incentives. When we test our 
proposition on a selection of democracies with direct presidential elections in 
the period 1945-2011 inclusive we find good support for it. However, we also 
show that with different measures of presidential power the reductive effect 
of presidential power can be seen when there are weak presidencies too. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the effect of presidential coattails is less 
important than has typically been suggested, that by contrast presidential 
power has an influence on the legislative party system, but also that we need 
to think carefully about how to capture variation in presidential power when 
trying to estimate its effect. This latter point applies to the debate about the 
determinants of the legislative party system but also to debates about the 
effect of presidential power more generally. 
 
Theory 
 
There is now a considerable body of work on the determinants of party 
systems. The effects of electoral systems are well known (Shugart 2005). 
However, the institutional determinants of party systems are not confined to 
electoral systems. Increasingly, there is an interest in the impact of direct 
presidential elections on the number of competitive political parties at 
legislative elections. When the president is elected on a separate ballot from 
members of the legislature, parties have to compete at two separate contests. 
This generates the potential for what Samuels and Shugart (2010: ch. 5) call 
“an electoral separation of purpose”. The electoral separation of purpose can 
vary. A low separation of purpose occurs when the presidential and 
legislative electorates of parties overlap. When this happens, similar to 
parliamentary systems presidents neither hurt nor improve their parties’ 
fortunes in legislative elections. A high separation of purpose occurs when 
the electorate for the presidential candidate is substantially different from that 
of candidates in the legislative race. What factors influence the variation in the 
electoral separation of purpose? 
One highly intuitive factor is the proximity of the presidential election 
to the legislative election (Shugart 1995). There is now considerable evidence 
that if the presidential election is held proximately to the legislative election, 
then there will be a reductive effect on legislative party system (Amorim Neto 
and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006). Working on the assumption 
that the presidency is the most important institution in the system, the 
presidential election becomes the focus of electoral competition. In this 
context, legislative elections approach second-order elections, especially when 
they are held immediately after the system-defining presidential election. The 
primacy of presidential over legislative elections ensures that presidential 
elections can have substantial coattails effects, shaping the legislative party 
system in its image. We see an example of this effect at work in France. In 
2000 a constitutional amendment reduced the length of the president’s term 
to five years, the same as for the legislature. At the same time, legislative 
elections were scheduled a few weeks after the presidential election. The 
result is that however close the result, there is a strong incentive for voters at 
the honeymoon legislative election to confirm the outcome of the presidential 
election, returning a majority for the newly elected president. We can clearly 
observe this effect following both the 2002, 2007, and 2012 presidential 
elections. Extrapolating on the basis of this logic, when the temporal gap 
between presidential and legislative elections grows, the shadow of the 
presidential election weakens. Thus, the coattails effect declines as the gap 
between the two elections increases. 
 Another factor is the presidential party system. There are good 
grounds to believe that the effective number of candidates at the presidential 
election shapes the effect of the proximity of presidential and legislative 
elections on the legislative party system. Cox (1997: 212) argues: “[t]he nature 
of the coattail opportunities that face legislative candidates should be similar, 
the nature of the advertising economies of scale that might be exploited 
should be similar, and so forth”. Thus, if there is a small number of 
candidates at the presidential election, this can reinforce the reductive effects 
of proximity on the legislative party system. By contrast, if the number of 
presidential candidates is high, then the reductive effects of proximity may be 
counteracted. Indeed, a high number of presidential candidates may have an 
inflationary effect on the legislative party system. Golder (2006) has tested 
and found support for this hypothesis. Specifically, he finds that presidential 
elections “stop having a statistically significant reductive effect on the number 
of electoral parties once there are more than about 2.8 effective presidential 
candidates” (ibid.: 40). Thus, Golder (ibid.) prioritizes the interaction between 
the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the effective 
number of candidates at the presidential election. 
 Recently, Hicken and Stoll (2013) have added a further factor to this 
debate. They emphasize the importance of presidential power. The direct 
election of the president does not imply that the president is the central 
political actor in the system. There are countries with directly elected but very 
weak presidents. Ireland is a case in point. There are others with relatively 
strong presidents, such as France, and yet others with very powerful 
presidents indeed, for example Chile. Thus, the size of the presidential prize 
varies from one country to another. As a result, there is no necessary reason to 
believe that presidential elections will always have the same impact on 
legislative elections. Instead, the effect of proximity and the number of 
candidates at the presidential election will depend on what Hicken and Stoll 
(ibid.: 295) call the “horizontal centralization” of policy-making authority. 
This means that a weak presidency may counteract the reductive effect of 
very proximate presidential and legislative elections on the legislative party 
system even when there are few candidates at the presidential election. In 
sum, Hicken and Stoll (2013) prioritize the interaction between the proximity 
of presidential and legislative elections, the effective number of candidates at 
the presidential election, and the power of the presidency. 
We aim to make two contributions to this debate. The first concerns the 
context to which it should be applied. To date, the theoretical insights of this 
literature have all been tested on data sets that pool countries with directly 
elected presidents and those without, including both parliamentary republics 
and parliamentary monarchies. For example, in Golder’s article parliamentary 
systems constitute 60.7 per cent of the 603 observations in his whole sample 
(2006: 39). In Hicken and Stoll’s study, parliamentary systems comprise 60.8 
per cent of the 590 observations in their pooled model. Indeed, monarchies 
alone make up 41.5 per cent of their total observations (2013: 304-305). 
However, the inclusion of parliamentary systems is somewhat puzzling, 
because the theory relates solely to the effects of direct presidential elections 
on legislative elections. What is the theoretical justification for including 
parliamentary systems in the study? Surprisingly, only Hicken and Stoll 
(2013) provide such a justification. They state: “the ultimate counterfactual to 
a presidential election being held concurrently with a legislative election is no 
presidential election at all. In other words, at the most basic level, the 
experimental "treatment" is the existence of a presidential election” (ibid: 300). 
They go on to say: “we compare the legislative party systems of the treatment 
group (legislative elections in regimes with a popularly elected president) to 
the legislative party systems of the control group (legislative elections in 
regimes without a popularly elected president)” (ibid.). Stoll (2013) reiterates 
this logic. 
The language of natural experimentation is alluring. Even so, we can 
question whether these studies meet basic experimental conditions. In 
particular, we can question whether the assignment of the treatment is ‘as if’ 
random (Dunning 2008). For example, there may be ‘demonstration effects’ 
such that countries choose systems that are close to their neighbors. The 
adoption of presidentialism across Latin America is a case in point. In 
addition, even if the treatment was assigned ‘as if’ randomly, are the 
treatment and control groups comparable (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012)? The 
same subjects are not observed before and after the application of a particular 
treatment or placebo. Instead, the differences within and between the subjects 
in the two groups are merely controlled for in the multivariate regression. 
This is an entirely appropriate way to test the theory, but it is not a natural 
experiment. Finally, when we conduct a natural experiment, we include a 
control group to provide us with variation in the explanatory variable. 
However, when we examine the effects of proximity, the effective number of 
presidential candidates, and presidential power on legislative party systems, 
we do not need the variation that comes with a control group. There is 
already variation within the set of countries with directly elected presidents. 
To put it another way, the experimental "treatment" is not the existence of a 
presidential election, it is the presence or absence of proximate presidential 
and legislative elections, a higher or lower number of effective presidential 
candidates, and stronger or weaker presidents. We should still be able to 
observe the effects of these variables solely within the population under 
consideration without the need for a parliamentary “control group”. 
In sum, we question whether parliamentary systems should be 
included in a test of a theory about the effects of direct presidential elections. 
We are skeptical as to whether their inclusion can be justified as an example 
of a natural experiment. Moreover, even if they are included, we would still 
expect the results to be robust to their exclusion. If they are not, then this 
would suggest that any positive findings are being driven by their inclusion 
in the dataset, rather than by the substantive effect on the population to which 
the hypothesized effect applies. 
Secondly, we think differently about the nature of the interaction 
between presidential power and the effective number of presidential 
candidates. We follow Cox (1997) above in thinking that there is a positive 
relationship between the effective number of presidential candidates and the 
legislative party system. We also have good theoretical reasons to expect that 
presidential power will affect the number of candidates at the presidential 
election. Hicken and Stoll (2008) have already proposed such a relationship. 
They hypothesize that when the presidency is very weak, parties have little 
incentive to stand candidates. So, the number of candidates should be small. 
However, when presidential power increases somewhat, then parties have 
more of an incentive to stand, but they have little incentive to coordinate their 
presidential candidates, meaning that number of candidates contesting the 
presidential election should be relatively high. When presidential power 
increases further still, the incentive for strategic coordination is present, 
meaning that the number of candidates should decline. Thus, they expect a 
bell-shaped curve. They find some evidence to support this theory, though as 
presidential power increases they find that the reductive effect disappears. In 
fact, they find that when presidents are very powerful, there is a puzzling 
increase in the number of candidates once again. So, rather than a bell-shaped 
curve, they find a sideways, elongated S shape (ibid.: 1120). At this high level 
of presidential power, though, the relationship with the number of 
presidential candidates is not statistically significant. 
We agree with Hicken and Stoll that there is likely to be a relationship 
between presidential power and the number of presidential candidates that 
will shape the legislative party system, but we think differently about the 
logic. We agree that when there is a very weak presidency, there may be little 
incentive for parties to stand a candidate at the presidential election. It may be 
more efficient to save the costs of campaigning for the legislative election. At 
the same time, though, when there is a very weak presidency the political 
costs of losing the presidential election are also very small. Moreover, non-
partisan candidates may have a greater incentive to stand. If the presidential 
election is seen as a second-order election, then partisan voting may be weak 
and non-partisan candidates may stand a greater chance of winning votes. 
Therefore, even when there is a very weak presidency, we may observe a 
large number of presidential candidates. Thus, a very weak presidency can be 
associated both with a small number of presidential candidates and a large 
number. Ireland is a case in point. Here, the president is very weak and since 
1937 six presidential elections have been uncontested. This suggests that the 
presidency is a prize that is scarcely worth winning and parties do not always 
see an incentive to contest it. Even so, in 2011 there were seven candidates 
with an effective number of 3.75. In addition to party nominees, there were 
also non-partisan candidates, one of whom came second at the election. So, 
the same country has experienced both very low and relatively high numbers 
of presidential candidates as a function of the calculations made by partisan 
and non-partisan actors. 
We expect an equivalent dual logic when the presidency is very 
powerful. In this case, the prize may be so big that parties have little incentive 
to engage in strategic coordination. The costs of not standing and, therefore, 
not winning the presidency may be so great that there is an incentive for 
parties to stand. So, Shugart and Carey (1992: 201) point out that if the stakes 
are sufficiently high, then the certainty of losing the presidency by not 
contesting it may be much worse than the probability of losing it to another 
opponent. This logic is similar to the one that Hicken and Stoll (2008: 1121) 
suggest to explain their puzzling finding. At the same time, though, if the 
prize is so great, then losing may also be very costly. As they suggest 
elsewhere but in relation to candidates at legislative elections (Hicken and 
Stoll 2013: 296), when the presidency is so powerful it is important to be on 
the winning side. Therefore, there may be an incentive not to stand a 
presidential candidate, but to wait and support the candidate that emerges 
victorious from the contest. Thus, a strong presidency may be associated both 
with a small number of presidential candidates and a large number. For 
example, in Panama there were three candidates at the 2009 presidential 
election with an effective number of only 1.99. By contrast, in 1994 there were 
seven candidates with an effective number of 5.56. 
If the logic about weak and strong presidents is correct, we would 
expect to observe a significant reductive effect of presidential power on the 
number of presidential candidates only in an intermediary range when the 
incentive for strategic coordination is strong. We can think of this effect in 
terms of the electoral separation of purpose. In this intermediary range, 
presidents and assemblies need to cooperate with each other in order to 
govern effectively and avoid political deadlock. Voters understand that 
presidents need the support of the assembly in order to pass the national 
policies on which they campaigned. Therefore, they have an incentive to 
support the president’s party at the legislative election too. Smaller parties 
may also see an incentive to be part of the presidential coalition rather than 
presenting their own candidates.	  For these parties, the strongest incentive to 
take sides occurs when the race between two serious presidential contenders 
is so close that by running their own candidates minor parties might risk 
tipping the balance in favor of their less preferred option (Shugart and Carey 
1992: 255). In sum, while we expect a positive relationship between the 
effective number of presidential candidates and the legislative party system, 
we expect presidential power to shape competition at the presidential election 
in a way that means we are only like to observe a reductive effect of 
presidential power on the legislative party system at an intermediary range of 
presidential power. 
Overall, we differ from both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) 
in that we expect the key interaction to be between presidential power and 
the effective number of presidential candidates, whereas they privilege 
proximity as a constituent element of their preferred interactions. We are 
agnostic about the independent effect of proximity. We wish to include an 
estimation of the effect of proximity to test for whether or not there is 
evidence of presidential coattails, but we do not necessarily expect it to find 
support for such an effect. In addition, whereas both Golder (2006) and 
Hicken and Stoll (2013) expect support for their preferred interactions when 
countries with direct presidential elections are pooled with countries with 
parliamentary systems, we have no such expectations about our preferred 
interaction. We expect to find support for it when the population is limited to 
countries with directly elected presidents. What is more, we argue that even if 
there is evidence to support both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) 
expectations when all countries are pooled, we would expect their findings 
still to be robust to the exclusion of parliamentary systems, otherwise a theory 
about the effect of direct elections would have little direct relevance to the 
population to which it is meant to apply. 
 
Variable descriptions 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the relative fragmentation of the party 
system at legislative elections. Consistent with Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), 
Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013), we capture this variable by coding 
the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). The main source of the data 
for this variable is Bormann and Golder’s (2013) dataset recording democratic 
electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. 
 We have three explanatory variables of interest. The first measures 
presidential power (PRESPOW). There are many different measures of 
presidential power and the reliability of some of these measures has been 
questioned (Fortin 2013). Moreover, the correlation between different 
measures can be relatively low (Tavits (2009: 48). Unsurprisingly, she finds 
that her results vary as a function of the measure she uses. One of the main 
reasons for the low correlations is that the measures are capturing different 
and/or multiple dimensions of presidential power. Ideally, we would want to 
compare the power of presidents along a single dimension. To this end, we 
take Siaroff’s (2003) measure of presidential power. The main advantage of 
this measure is that it tries to capture actual rather than merely constitutional 
presidential power. Siaroff’s measure comprises nine separate indicators. We 
conduct a factor analysis to determine whether a combination of these 
indicators can capture a single dimension of presidential power. However, we 
exclude two of them – whether or not the president is directly elected and 
whether the president and the legislature are elected concurrently – because 
they are already included independently in our study. We take the remaining 
seven indicators and perform an iterated factor analysis, which is appropriate 
for indicators recording binary variables. We retain two factors. The rotated 
factor loadings show one factor capturing a single dimension of presidential 
power comprising just one variable and another comprising three variables. 
We focus on the latter. The three variables are: whether or not the president 
chairs cabinet meetings, has a central role in foreign policy, and in 
government formation. These three indicators capture a range of presidential 
activity, ranging from the formation of government, to its ongoing 
management, to the formulation of policy. So, we can be confident that 
together they are not simply capturing an idiosyncratic aspect of presidential 
power. On the basis of these indicators, we generate a four-point measure of 
presidential power with a range 0-3 inclusive. The rotated factor loadings and 
the full set of presidential power scores can be found in the supplemental 
materials at http://prq.sagepub.com. 
 The second explanatory variable is the effective number of presidential 
candidates (ENPC). This variable records the ENPC figure for the presidential 
election that was held immediately prior to the legislative election if the 
elections are not concurrent or at the concurrent presidential election if they 
are. We take the values of ENPC from the data set described in Bormann and 
Golder (2013) and their enpres variable. This means that in the event of an 
uncontested presidential election, such as ones in Ireland, we record an ENPC 
value of 1. Consistent with the practice adopted by Golder (2006) and Hicken 
and Stoll (2013), we record an ENPC value of 0 in countries without a directly 
elected president. 
 The third explanatory variable is a measure of the proximity between 
presidential and legislative elections (PROXIMITY). Again, we follow 
standard practice and follow the methodology adopted by Amorim Neto and 
Cox (1997), Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013). The PROXIMITY 
measure ranges from a value of 0 when a legislative election is held at the 
exact mid-point between two presidential elections and 1 when the legislative 
election is held concurrently with the presidential election. The only change 
we make is that we calculate the value as a function of the days between the 
two types of elections. This means that we have a continuous variable within 
a range 0-1. By contrast, Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) calculate 
the value as a function of the years between the two types of elections. This 
means we have a greater variation in the values for our proximity variable 
than Golder and Hicken and Stoll. Even so, we are confident that this 
amendment does not substantively change the results because Stoll (2013) has 
shown that Golder’s results are robust to whether years or days are used as 
the units to calculate the proximity index. Consistent with the existing 
literature, the PROXIMITY value for countries with a parliamentary system is 
always recorded as a value of 0. 
 We have three control variables. These are the same as those included 
in the models by Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013). The first 
(MAGNITUDE) captures the independent effect of the electoral system for 
legislative elections. MAGNITUDE is a measure of the average district 
magnitude in the lowest electoral tier in a country (Golder 2006: 37). It is 
calculated as the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by 
the total number of districts in that tier. We take the values from the data set 
described in Bormann and Golder (2013) and their tier1_avemag variable. 
Where there are missing observations we calculate the values ourselves using 
their formula. This affects 3.8 per cent of the total observations. Consistent 
with standard practice, we log the values for this variable. The second control 
variable (ENEG) captures the level of social divisions in a country. This is the 
effective number of ethnic groups. We take the values for ENEG from the 
replication data set that Golder (2007) makes available for his 2006 article. 
This variable is stationary within country units. Therefore, we can record a 
value for countries beyond the period included in Golder’s study. Golder 
calculated the ENEG figures from Fearon’s (2003) data. Therefore, where 
countries are missing from Golder’s data set, we calculate the ENEG value 
directly from Fearon’s data. These data are available at 
www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ (accessed 1 July 2013). Thirdly, consistent with 
previous work, we include an interaction of MAGNITUDE*ENEG. 
 
Data and model specifications 
 
We test our theory on an original data set of countries and elections from 
1945-2011. The rules for the inclusion of countries in the data set, the full list 
of countries included, and the time periods for which we record elections is 
listed in the supplemental materials at http://prq.sagepub.com. We have a 
total of 546 legislative elections in 82 countries. The number of elections per 
country ranges from 1 to 32. 
 We use the models with the same constitutive explanatory variables as 
Golder (2006: 37) and Hicken and Stoll (2013: 301). (See Table 1). However, the 
interaction terms and the case selection vary across the set of models. Model 1 
replicates Golder’s (2006) model where the interaction term of interest is 
PROXIMITY*ENPC. This model includes parliamentary systems. Model 2 
replicates Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) model where the interaction term of 
interest is PRESPOW*PROXIMITY*ENPC. This model includes parliamentary 
systems and also includes three further constitutive interaction terms 
PROXIMITY*ENPC, PRESPOW*ENPC and PRESPOW*PROXIMITY. Models 
1 and 2 are designed to determine whether or not we can replicate the original 
results of Golder’s (2006) and Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) models. If we can, 
then we can be confident that our case selection is not artificially driving the 
result. Model 3 replicates Model 1 but excludes parliamentary systems. Model 
4 replicates Model 2 but excludes parliamentary systems. Model 5 tests the 
model that we propose in this article. Here, the interaction term of interest is 
PRESPOW*ENPC. We include PROXIMITY as a control variable and we test 
the model solely on countries with a directly elected president. Consistent 
with the original specifications, we use ordinary least squares regression to 
estimate Models 1-4 and, consistent with Golder’s (2006) preferred estimation, 
we report country-clustered standard errors in parentheses for Models 1 and 
3, while for Models 2 and 4, consistent with Hicken and Stoll’s (2013: 303) 
preferred estimation, we report Newey-West standard errors, which are 
robust to both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, in parentheses. For 
Model 5 we use Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected-standard-errors 
(PCSE) model. Hicken and Stoll (2013: 315) reject this estimation technique on 
the grounds that there is little theoretical reason to expect cross-country 
contemporaneous correlation in such models and that it is difficult to obtain a 
good estimate of this correlation when there are few common time periods 
across countries. However, most of our observations are from the early 1990s 
onwards and we know there are demonstration effects at elections across 
countries. For example, recent Latin American elections have increasingly 
manifested similar types of presidential candidates, ranging from more left-
wing populist often indigenous candidates to more neo-liberal, pro-business 
candidates often backed by international investors. So, it is reasonable to use a 
PCSE model as our main model. However, we do re-estimate our model with 
Newey-West standard errors and report the results along with other 
robustness tests below. 
 Results and robustness tests 
 
We report the results of the five models in Table 1. Model 1 tests Golder’s 
hypothesis with the inclusion of parliamentary systems. It is very difficult to 
interpret the regression table when there are interaction terms (Brambor et al 
2006). Therefore, like Golder (2006: 41, Figure 1e), Figure 1 portrays the key 
interaction effect graphically. In Golder’s original model proximate 
presidential and legislative elections have a reductive impact on the effective 
number of legislative parties when the effective number of presidential 
candidates is slightly fewer than three. The same model with our dataset 
shows the same result when the effective number of presidential candidates is 
around the same figure. Therefore, we are capturing his key finding. Our 
model also shows a significant inflationary impact on the effective number of 
legislative parties when the effective number of presidential candidates is 
greater than about five, whereas Golder does not show this result. However, 
his graph ends when this figure is seven and the trend for the effective 
number of legislative parties is upwards. Overall, we can be confident that 
our dataset is generating basically the same result as Golder’s original model. 
Table 1 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
Model 2 tests Hicken and Stoll’s hypothesis with the inclusion of 
parliamentary systems. In their article, Hicken and Stoll (2013: 307) present 
figures that show the interaction of the proximity of presidential and 
legislative elections and the effective number of presidential candidates at 
four values of presidential power. Given space limitations, we discuss the 
results for just one value, namely when the president is relatively strong with 
a presidential power score of 2 on our four-point scale from 0-3. The 
interaction effect is presented graphically in the supplemental materials at 
http://prq.sagepub.com. We find that when there is a relatively strong 
president proximate presidential and legislative elections have a reductive 
impact on the legislative party system when the effective number of 
presidential candidates is fewer than three. We also find that when there is a 
large effective number of presidential candidates, there is a significant 
inflationary impact on the effective number of legislative parties. Both results 
are very similar to those of Hicken and Stoll. We do not report them, but we 
find equally similar results for values equivalent to very weak and very 
strong presidents too. Overall, we can be confident that our dataset is 
generating very similar results to those reported in the original articles by 
Golder and Hicken and Stoll. 
 Model 3 tests Golder’s hypothesis excluding parliamentary systems. 
Figure 2 graphs the key interaction effect. We see very clearly that the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections has no significant effect on 
the legislative party system at any value for the effective number of 
presidential candidates. Model 4 tests Hicken and Stoll’s hypothesis 
excluding parliamentary systems. The key interaction effect is presented 
graphically in the supplemental materials at http://prq.sagepub.com. Again, 
we discuss the result with a presidential power value of 2. Like the result for 
Golder, we find that at this value of presidential power the proximity of 
presidential and legislative elections has no effect on the legislative party 
system whatever the value of the effective number of presidential candidates. 
We do not report them, but we find the same result for values equivalent to 
very weak and very strong presidents too. Overall, we find that when we 
exclude parliamentary systems there is no longer support for either Golder’s 
or Hicken and Stoll’s hypotheses. 
Figure 2 about here 
 Model 5 tests our hypothesis solely on countries with directly elected 
presidents. Figure 3 graphs the key interaction effect. In general, we find a 
linear trend. Presidential power has a reductive effect on the legislative party 
system for low values of the effective number of presidential candidates and 
an inflationary effect for high values. So, even if there are conflicting 
incentives to stand candidates at both low and high levels of presidential 
power, it would appear as if the reductive effect on the legislative party 
system of the effect number of candidates is dominant when there is a weak 
presidency and few presidential candidates and the inflationary effect is 
dominant when there is a strong presidency and many presidential 
candidates. However, as expected, the reductive effect is significant only at an 
intermediate range of presidential candidates. Specifically, we find a 
significant result for such a reduction in a range between 1.5-2.5 candidates. 
When there are high values for the effective number of presidential 
candidates, we do not find a significant inflationary effect. We note, though, 
that the substantive effect of our finding is small. In terms of the control 
variables, the interaction effect between the effective number of ethnic groups 
and the natural log of average district magnitude returns the expected result. 
The effective number of ethnic groups has a significant and positive effect on 
the legislative party system at values for the natural log of average district 
magnitude that are greater than about 0.5, namely outside pure first-past-the-
post systems. 
 Figure 3 about here 
To confirm the robustness of our result, we re-estimated Model 5 using 
OLS with Newey-West standard errors in the same way as Hicken and Stoll 
(2013). We do not report them here, but we find almost identical results. We 
also re-estimated the model without the inclusion of the MAGNITUDE values 
that we calculated ourselves. Again, the results are substantively the same. 
There is, though, a nagging concern about the presidential power variable. 
We noted long-standing issues relating to the reliability of presidential power 
measures and the sensitivity of results to different such measures. To explore 
these concerns, we re-estimated Model 5 on the basis of a number of different 
measures of presidential power. First, we created a second new measure by 
pooling ten existing ones (Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo 2009; Armingeon 
and Carreja 2004; Cranenburgh 2008; Elgie and Moestup 2008; Johannsen 
2003; Moestrup 2011; Frye 2002; Hicken and Still 2008; Shugart and Carey 
1992; and Siaroff 2003). (See supplemental materials at 
http://prq.sagepub.com.) The advantage of pooling existing measures in this 
way is that the idiosyncrasies of individual measures are likely to wash out. 
The correlation between the values for our first presidential power variable 
and this variable is 0.89. When we re-estimated Model 5 with the new 
presidential power variable, we returned the same result, but with a much 
bigger substantive effect. Second, we re-estimated Model 5 using the 
presidential power scores from Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) dataset. This time 
we returned the same general result, but we observed that presidential power 
had a reductive effect on the legislative party system in an intermediate range 
of values for the effective number of presidential candidates only within 90 
per cent confidence intervals (p = 0.055 at an ENPC value of 3). 
A problem with these two new measures is that they are almost 
certainly capturing multiple dimensions of presidential power. So, to test the 
robustness of our results further we wish to re-estimate Model 5 with an 
alternative measure that captures only a single dimension. To do so, we 
return to Siaroff (2003). When we factor analyzed this data set initially, we 
retained two factors. When we retain only one, we capture a single dimension 
of presidential power comprising four variables. These are the three original 
indicators plus whether or not the president has discretionary appointment 
powers over key individuals in the system. Incorporating this new indicator, 
we create a five-point scale of presidential power ranging from 0-4. When we 
re-estimate Model 5 using this presidential power variable we see as before a 
significant reductive effect on the legislative party system in an intermediate 
range of values for the effective number of presidential candidates, but we 
also see a similar effect for a very small number too. (See Figure 4). This result 
is consistent with the essentially linear trend that we observed in Figure 3. 
However, in contrast to the results from Model 5, when we use a different 
measure of presidential power we find that presidential power has a 
significant reductive effect on the legislative party system for low values of 
the effective number of presidential candidates as well as for values in the 
intermediary range, even if there is still no significant inflationary effect at 
high values. Overall, we find that our results are robust to various measures 
of presidential power, but that they do change when different measures of 
this concept are operationalized. We address this point in the discussion 
section below. 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Discussion 
 
These results raise two main issues. Firstly, they show that in countries with 
direct presidential elections the proximity of presidential elections to 
legislative elections has neither an independent effect on the legislative party 
system nor an effect that depends upon another standard institutional 
variable. This finding flies in the face of well-known empirical examples, such 
as the French case since 2002. It also goes against the findings of Shugart 
(1995), who identified a separate independent effect of proximate elections, as 
well as Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll 
(2013), who all found a significant effect for proximity when interacted with 
other variables. We stress that our findings are probabilistic. We do not claim 
there is no promixity effect anywhere. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to 
think there is a proximity effect in France, whereas generally this is not the 
case. More substantively, though, we are struck by how the debate about the 
effect of proximate elections has developed over time. Shugart and Carey 
(1992) first discussed the notion of an independent effect of proximity, but did 
not submit it to rigorous testing. Shugart (1995) did test its independent effect, 
but on only a relatively small number of countries. Amorim Neto and Cox 
(1997) and Golder (2006) then tested its effect in interaction with the effective 
number of presidential candidates. Hicken and Stoll (2013) added a further 
interaction with presidential powers. One way of thinking about this debate is 
to say that researchers have been downgrading the independent effect of 
proximity over the course of time. Put another way, while the idea that 
presidential elections have an impact on the legislative party system is highly 
intuitive, work has increasingly suggested that this intuition needs to be 
refined. In this context, our findings merely take such a story to its logical 
conclusion. What is more, we have stressed that since the work of Amorim 
Neto and Cox (1997) studies of proximity have included countries with 
indirectly elected presidents and monarchs in their estimations. Indeed, we 
have noted that parliamentary countries comprise a majority of the 
observations in recent studies. Yet, by definition, there can be no coattails 
effect in these countries. For that reason, the coding of the proximity variable 
in them is hypothetical. The value recorded is the same as the one for 
elections at the exact mid-term in a country with a direct presidential election. 
This strategy is the best available option if parliamentary republics and 
monarchies are to be included. However, why include them when we have no 
expectations about the effect of the key variables under consideration in these 
regimes, when including them requires recording a hypothetical value, and 
when there is already variation in the key set of explanatory variables under 
investigation within the set of countries with direct presidential elections 
alone? Overall, while there has been a long-standing expectation about the 
effect of proximate presidential and legislative elections on the legislative 
party system, we find no evidence of this effect and we suggest that this 
finding is not as unusual as it might at first appear, given the way in which 
the debate has developed over time and given recent research strategies. 
 Secondly, we have stressed the importance of presidential power in 
shaping the legislative party system when interacted with the effective 
number of presidential candidates. All the same, we have shown that there 
are ongoing concerns with how a presidential power variable is typically 
operationalized. There are problems of face validity. For example, some 
measures of presidential power, particularly those that record solely 
constitutional powers, record low values for presidents who are typically 
strong in practice and relatively high values for those who are weak. There 
are also problems of reliability. Most measures capture presidential power on 
the basis of many different individual indicators. However, in so doing they 
conflate multiple dimensions of presidential power, rendering aggregate 
measures problematic. We have tried to address these problems by working 
from an index that tries to capture presidential power in practice and by 
generating cross-national scores on the basis of a single dimension of 
presidential power. Even so, we acknowledge that our results vary to a 
greater or lesser extent as different measures of presidential power are 
operationalized. This is to be expected. Indeed, we would be very surprised if 
Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) results were not sensitive to different measures of 
presidential power as well. In fact, the same point is likely to apply to any 
study that operationalizes this variable. Our study has shown that it is 
necessary to operationalize the concept of presidential power very carefully 
and to submit the results of any estimation that includes this variable to 
rigorous robustness checks. Indeed, this point applies not only to the ongoing 
debate about the institutional determinants of legislative party systems, but 
also to topics in comparative politics more broadly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article builds on the existing literature about the effect of presidential 
coattails on the legislative party system. Controlling for standard electoral 
system and social heterogeneity variables, we argue that the legislative party 
system is shaped by the effective number of presidential candidates but only 
within an intermediary range of presidential power. This is because 
presidential power itself helps to determine the effective number of 
presidential candidates by encouraging parties to behave strategically but 
only in a way that we can clearly observe within such an intermediary range. 
We also think differently about how we should test for the effect of this 
interaction. Typically, scholars have done so by pooling presidential, semi-
presidential, and parliamentary countries, even though the effect of the 
variable under investigation only applies to countries with direct presidential 
elections. We are skeptical that parliamentary countries can be included on 
the basis that they constitute a natural experiment. Instead, we suggest that 
the effects under consideration should be tested solely in countries with 
directly elected presidents. Overall, our results cast doubt on the highly 
intuitive idea that presidential coattails shape the legislative party system. 
However, they reinforce the idea that the effective number of presidential 
candidates is an important determinant of the legislative party system, 
suggesting that we need to reassess the determinants of this factor. Following 
Hicken and Stoll (2013), we emphasize presidential power in this regard. We 
show that presidential power is a difficult concept to capture and that there 
are problems with many existing measures. We argue that when we wish to 
estimate the effect of presidential power on an outcome variable, we need to 
think carefully about how we capture the concept and that we should avoid 
drawing conclusions from results that rely on a single measure. This point 
applies not only to the ongoing debate about the institutional determinants of 
legislative party systems, but also to many topics in comparative politics more 
generally. 
  
Table 1 Estimating the effective number of electoral parties 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
PROXIMITY 
-3.39 
(0.64)*** 
-3.19 
(1.19)*** 
-0.46 
(0.83) 
-0.90 
(2.20) 
0.05 
(0.25) 
ENPC 
0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.24)*** 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.70 
(0.35)** 
PROXIMITY 
*ENPC 
1.02 
(0.27)*** 
1.25 
(0.42)*** 
0.15 
(0.28) 
0.49 
(0.78) 
 
PRESPOW  
-0.73 
(0.11)*** 
 
-0.64 
(0.47) 
-0.43 
(0.31) 
PRESPOW* 
PROXIMITY 
 
0.65 
(0.45) 
 
0.36 
(0.80) 
 
PRESPOW* 
ENPC 
 
0.26 
(0.06)*** 
 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
PRESPOW* 
PROXIMITY* 
ENPC 
 
-0.30 
(0.16)* 
 
-0.18 
(0.28) 
 
ENEG 
0.25 
(0.15)* 
0.11 
(0.08) 
0.26 
(0.22) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
MAGNITUDE 
0.08 
(0.32) 
-0.19 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
-0.29 
(0.31) 
-0.29 
(0.28) 
MAGNITUDE* 
ENEG 
0.20 
(0.17) 
0.29 
(0.11)*** 
0.24 
(0.27) 
0.41 
(0.18)** 
0.41 
(0.17)** 
Constant 
2.98 
(0.50)*** 
3.73 
(0.29)*** 
0.39 
(0.92) 
2.23 
(1.29)* 
1.69 
(0.91)* 
N 454 444 291 288 288 
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.38 
Root mean 
square error 
1.76 1.70 1.73 1.69 1.69 
 
Country-
clustered 
standard 
errors 
Newey-
West 
standard 
errors 
Country-
clustered 
standard 
errors 
Newey-
West 
standard 
errors 
Panel-
corrected 
standard 
errors 
  
Figure 1 Replication of Golder’s model (Model 1) 
 
Figure 2 Replication of Golder’s model without parliamentary systems 
(Model 3) 
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Figure 3 The interaction of presidential power and the effective 
number of presidential candidates on the legislative party 
system (Model 5) 
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Figure 4 The interaction of presidential power and the effective 
number of presidential candidates on the legislative party 
system with an alternative measure of presidential power 
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